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IMPLICIT PENSION DEBT IN GERMANY 
 
1 Introduction 
Conventional economic wisdom has it that a public pay-as-you-go pension scheme in-
evitably involves an implicit type of government debt (for early references that received 
much attention at an international level, see van den Noord and Herd 1993, 1994).
1 This 
debt is introduced when the system is phased in and, by definition, starts to pay out 
benefits immediately based on current contributions. During an initial phase, benefits 
accrue to individuals of retirement age who have not – at least, not over their entire ac-
tive life span – contributed to financing the scheme. In the extreme case of a pure pay-
as-you-go scheme, funding for these benefits fully exhausts the contributions collected 
among those who are currently active, and none of the contributions are accumulated. 
Instead, early contributors are given the promise – or, in most cases, a legal entitlement 
– that they will receive a pension later on. As these outstanding benefits will, in turn, be 
financed from future contributions that are collected using the coërcive power of public 
authorities, they fully conform to the notion of public debt. 
  Once the system is matured, meaning that all existing pensioners have a full life-
time record of contributions, the implicit debt will be simply rolled over from one gen-
eration to another. Within an overall system of revolving loans, part of the debt is con-
tinuously redeemed by paying out pension benefits, while current contributions always 
turn into fresh debt (see Sinn 2000 or Fenge and Werding 2003 for further details). 
There is thus always a certain amount of benefit entitlements that will become effective 
only in the future, but arises from contributions that have already been made. 
  Within the total balance sheet of a given public pension scheme, there are mainly 
two types of “assets” by which the implicit pension debt is effectively covered. First, in 
a partially funded system, where some fraction of the contributions is continuously ac-
cumulated to prefund for future benefits, there can be a substantial stock of financial 
reserves. Second, whatever the remainder of the implicit debt, it should be next to auto-
matically covered by future contributions. However, calling these contributions an asset 
                                            
1   We are well aware that, probably all over the industrialised world, economists have brought forth 
similar ideas much earlier at a national level, when existing pay-as-you-go pension systems were inau-
gurated or extended to an almost universal coverage after or even before the Second World War.   2
asset is an elusive concept, and accounting for them in any practical calculations regard-
ing the size of the implicit pension debt requires a lot of care to avoid tautological con-
clusions and to allow for meaningful comparisons. We will keep this in mind and return 
to a number of details involved throughout the following considerations. 
 
2  Lessons from the literature and the discussion so far 
  Early attempts at measuring the size of implicit pension debt for a limited number of 
industrialised countries were relatively rough in their methodology (see Hagemann and 
Nicoletti 1989, van den Noord and Herd 1993, 1994, or Kuné et al. 1993). Not surpris-
ingly, the results turned out to be a multiple of current GDP in most cases and often 
dwarfed the figures for explicit government debt and the debt ratios officially recorded. 
There has been a limited number of follow-up studies, some conducted at an interna-
tional level
2 and a larger number dealing with single countries only
3. At the same time, 
other authors pointed to ambiguities and possible sources of misinterpretation in any of 
the approaches taken in this strand of literature (see, e.g. Haveman 1994, Franco 1995 
or Disney 2001). 
  Most of the subsequent work therefore turned to developing other indicators to ad-
dress the role of public pay-as-you-go pensions and other types of government expendi-
ture for the long-term sustainability of public finances.
4 For instance, EU-level authori-
ties are currently working on new, sophisticated measures of fiscal sustainability (see 
EU Economic Policy Committee 2003) that are meant to support the EU-wide consulta-
tion process regarding sound fiscal policies and the observation of the criteria of the 
“Stability and Growth Pact”, with a particular focus on the Eurozone countries. Un-
funded liabilities of public pension schemes are an important ingredient in calculating 
any of these indicators, but explicit calculations regarding the aggregate size of implicit 
pension debt are no longer part of these efforts. 
  To some extent, this may have to change in the future, mainly because not including 
this type of debt within the accounting framework for the public sector creates opportu-
                                            
2   See, for instance, Chand and Jaeger (1996) or Frederiksen (2001). 
3   For a survey, see Franco et al. (2005, Section 5, especially Table 4). 
4   See, e.g., Leibfritz et al. (1995) and Roseveare et al. (1996) whose work was extended, and much 
refined, for the comparative study documented in OECD (2001, ch. 4, 2002). This latter study was 
prepared in co-operation with the EU Economic Policy Committee (2001) that used it as a point of de-
parture for further refinements. 
  Also, the host of studies based on the “Generational-accounting” methodology suggested by Auerbach 
et al. (1991) is based on a parallel idea. But like in the more recent OECD projects, numerous gov-
ernment budget items other than pension expenditure enter the notions of implicit debt and fiscal sus-
tainability applied there, and the results are condensed to form other, more complex indicators of int-
ergenerational equity. See Auerbach et al. (1999) or Kotlikoff and Raffelhüschen (1999) for collec-
tions and surveys of applied work in this area.   3
nities to manipulate official figures on current public deficits and debts wherever these 
are under external surveillance. For instance, on several occasions during the last years 
the EU had to deal with cases where national governments took over unfunded pension 
liabilities from private, often formerly state-owned, corporations against the payment of 
a notable lump sum. With current accounting standards, such lump-sum payments re-
duce the current budget deficit, while the additional liabilities are nowhere recorded.
5 
Another, and probably more important, reason is that international rating agencies have 
recently stressed their interest in including the amounts and future trends of implicit 
pension debt in the criteria for their country credit ratings (see, e.g., Kraemer et al. 
2005). If this is a serious ambition, not just relevant in cases of obvious fiddling with 
explicit debt figures, then national governments themselves might become interested in 
determining and publishing the relevant data. 
  At the same time, one has to acknowledge that accounting for implicit pension debt 
is not as straightforward as it may seem from our introductory remarks. The discussion 
that has unfolded over the last fifteen years provides a number of important lessons that 
will have to be dealt with in any related effort. 
  First, there are effectively different notions of implicit pension debt (see Holzmann 
et al. 2000), at least two of which are really important: those based on accrued-to-date 
liabilities (ADL) and on open-system liabilities (OSL). ADL is essentially what was 
sketched in the introduction of this paper, viz. outstanding benefit entitlements linked to 
past and current contributions, to be determined “as if” the scheme under scrutiny were 
closed for new accruals starting, say, the next year. Among the alternative definitions, 
ADL is certainly closest to the notion of explicit government debt. On the other hand, 
the concept may fail to fully capture larger shifts in future pension finances that can be 
due to massive changes in the population structure (“demographic ageing”) or, no less 
important, to policy responses that become effective only gradually, over a long transi-
tion period. For this reason, other measures have been devised that address the expected 
continuation of the scheme and augment ADL measures by benefits linked to future 
contributions. In the limiting case, long-term projections regarding the pension 
scheme’s budget can be extended to cover an infinite (“open”) time horizon, in order to 
                                            
5   In a news release of 21 October 2003, Eurostat confirmed that this incomplete, hence misleading, 
accounting procedure is fully in line with the existing rules. Changing these rules might therefore be 
the only way out if the practice sketched above were adopted on a larger scale. Note that, while mis-
perceptions of annual deficit figures could be avoided by not accounting for the lump-sum payment, 
misleading changes in accumulated debt still were next to inevitable if one would not want to intro-
duce multiple time series regarding actual vs notional public debt. 
  In a sense, the practice sketched here runs counter to one of the standard objections to officially ac-
counting for implicit pension debt, namely that entitlements to receive unfunded pensions cannot be 
traded (Franco 1995). While this may be true for individuals who are future beneficiaries, it does not 
equally apply to the government or other sponsoring bodies.   4
fully spell out the implications of current pension law in terms of OSL-type measures.
6 
In this paper, for reasons that should become clear as we go along, we will present esti-
mates regarding both kinds of measures for the German Statutory Pension Scheme. 
  Second, international comparisons regarding the size of implicit pension debt are 
very difficult to make. The problem is not so much that, in attempting to do so, one has 
to deal with lots of specific details of each of the pension schemes covered when prepar-
ing projections of future benefits (and contributions) – a point suggesting that one 
should involve national experts in one way or another in order to obtain reliable results. 
The main obstacle is that there is a deep-rooted conflict between reliability and compa-
rability of projections for pension schemes in different countries. Going a long way in 
harmonizing assumptions regarding a host of relevant aspects of individual behaviour 
and macro-economic developments is likely to yield implausible, if not misleading, pro-
jections for some of the countries involved. On the other hand, with assumptions that 
are not fully harmonized to take care of country-specific features, it is difficult to assess 
what is effectively compared in such exercises: cross-country differences in institutions, 
such as the legal framework of national pension schemes, or differences in behaviour 
and in general economic conditions. What can be accomplished much more easily are 
comparisons that cover just one country over time, capturing the impact of changes in 
the legal framework, including the potential effects of future reforms. Therefore, this is 
what we will effectively restrict our attention to in this paper, assuming that our obser-
vations from Germany may involve some lessons, direct or indirect, for other countries 
as well. Hopefully, this is still true even if we acknowledge a further lesson that arises 
from the existing literature. 
  Third, when attempting to measure implicit pension debt, the appropriate perspec-
tive to be taken and the issues and sub-issues to be looked at vary substantially by sys-
tems and, hence, by countries. For instance, in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme with 
notionally defined benefits (NDB), such as the German one, it is really the implicit debt 
involved in future benefit entitlements that is of highest importance. By contrast, in no-
tionally defined contributions (NDC) schemes, such as those in place in Italy and Swe-
den following major reforms enacted in these countries in the 1990s,
7 projecting future 
contributions is at least equally important. In the former case, contributions basically 
                                            
6   An alternative is to estimate the size of ADL not only for the current year, but as a time series of an-
nual ADL figures over an extended time period into the future, as in Oksanen (2005). With the de-
tailed simulations entering our ADL calculations below, however, this would be a difficult task. 
7   For relevant descriptions, see Franco (2002) and Palmer (2002). 
  Note that the distinction between DB-type and DC-type schemes was originally developed for private, 
funded schemes, mainly for employer-based pension plans. However, the discussion about the Italian 
and Swedish pension reforms has shown that it can be meaningfully applied to unfunded pension 
schemes as well, with the additional qualification that the relevant links are just “notional” in this case.   5
have to adjust to meet existing liabilities – and one may ask, whether this appears to be 
realistic –, while in the latter case, future pension benefits are the main political variable 
that has to adjust to expected revenues – and one might be interested in whether these 
benefits are likely to be adequate. In other words, setting up a full-scale balance sheet 
including a projected “contribution asset” makes a lot more sense for the new NDC-type 
public pension schemes (see, for instance, Settergren 2005) than for traditional NDB-
type schemes. In the following, we will therefore primarily focus on implicit (AD and 
OS) liabilities involved in the German public pension system, accounting for expected 
future contributions only to the extent that this is needed – in a way that is hopefully 
instructive, even though some of our findings turn out to be highly country-specific. 
  The on-going debate about the implicit debt entailed in pay-as-you-go public pen-
sion schemes implies, among other things, that schemes of this kind are funded, in a 
sense, by the earnings capacity of future contributors or, speaking more generally, by 
the human capital embodied in the future workforce. While this is, again, conventional 
economic wisdom, little attention is paid in actual pension policies to potentials links 
between the way most pay-as-you-go pension schemes are operated and the accumula-
tion of human capital. Considering the existing body of theoretical and empirical re-
search on this issue, it may be too early to include these links in standard estimates and 
calculations regarding the size of implicit pension debt. Yet, in Part B of the present 
paper, we will return to this issue, briefly reviewing the relevant literature and discuss-
ing how the view that pay-as-you-go pensions are built on some form of “human-capital 
funding” could affect the way such schemes are actually designed. Again, we will use 
the case of Germany as an example. The remainder of Part A is devoted to discussing 
some further conceptual issues involved in estimating implicit pension debt (Section 3) 
and to presenting up-dated estimates for the German Statutory Pension Scheme as it has 
evolved over a series of consecutive reforms taken since the early 1990s (Section 4). 
 
3 Conceptual  issues 
3.1 Definition of liabilities 
As was already explained, our calculations in this paper are based on two different no-
tions of implicit pension debt, viz. accrued-to-date liabilities as well as open-system 
liabilities. The definitions of these two concepts are as follows. 
 Accrued-to-date  liabilities (ADL) are given, for each point in time, by the present 
values of (a) outstanding benefit entitlements of current pensioners plus (b) future bene-
fit entitlements of the active population to the extent that these are linked to their past 
and current contributions. Here, “benefit entitlements” refer to the full package of bene-
fits – disability pensions, old-age pensions and survivor pensions – that regular con-  6
tributors are entitled to receive simply by paying the standard rate of contributions. De-
termining the extent to which future benefits are “linked to” contributions already made 
is relatively easy in (“Bismarckian”) pension schemes with an explicit, and largely pro-
portional, link between earnings or contributions on the one hand and benefit entitle-
ments on the other. But even in the other limiting case of so-called flat-rate (or “Bever-
idgean”) pensions, benefits are usually assessed based on periods of contributions (or 
residence, if nothing else) on a simple pro-rata basis, so that existing accruals can be 
identified in some sense. 
  Open-system liabilities (OSL) include parts (a) and (b) of the definition of ADL. 
They add the present values of (c) future benefit entitlements of the currently active 
population that will arise from their future contributions, to be paid over the regular 
course of a working life, and (d) future benefit entitlements of all future contributors, 
estimated with an infinite time horizon. Against the ADL definition, the inclusion of 
future benefit entitlements that are not yet accrued is meant to reflect the expectation 
that the scheme under scrutiny will be continued based on the current legal framework – 
without an arbitrary choice of the relevant time horizon, that is, virtually forever. Note 
that the extension to an infinite time horizon does not raise fundamental technical prob-
lems: even if benefits are expected to grow on real terms, their discounted present val-
ues will usually decline and converge towards zero, so that the sum of all future benefit 
entitlements should be finite. 
  By their definition, ADL measures correspond to acute liabilities that are very close 
to any conventional definition of explicit government debt. When assessed on relative 
terms, for instance, as a percentage of current GDP, they are mainly a function of the 
“system participation rate”, that is, the fraction of the active population that is actually 
covered by the public pension scheme, and of the “quasi-replacement rate” of average 
benefits over average wages (for further details, see Fenge and Werding 2003). For in-
stance, the implicit pension debt in terms of ADL should be lower for categorical sys-
tems, covering only part of the labour force, than for universal systems that cover the 
entire labour force, or even the entire population. At the same time, ADL debt should be 
higher for relatively generous, earnings-related pension schemes than for basic pension 
schemes. Interestingly, these two dimensions are usually combined in such a way that 
comparing ADL measures across countries does not necessarily lead to patterns that are 
easily predictable. Also, note that changes in the ADL-to-GDP ratio that are a result of 
demographic ageing do not have a clear sign.
8 Their movement mainly depends on how 
                                            
8   Yet, if demographic ageing comes about as a large group of “baby boomers” gradually working them-
selves through the age distribution, it is highly likely that ADL per GDP increases substantially in the 
years when the relevant age cohorts are approaching retirement.   7
labour productivity, hence wages, respond to changes in the population structure and on 
how this feeds through to current and future benefits. While the former is a matter of 
technology and economic conditions, the latter is an institutional feature that can be 
manipulated deliberately in order to contain the amount of implicit pension debt. 
  By and large, all of these properties also extend to the OSL definition of implicit 
pension debt. As was already mentioned, the main advantage in using this broader defi-
nition is that the ADL measure may be too narrow to fully capture the impact of long-
term demographic change or of policy responses that take effect only over long transi-
tion periods. The timing of prospective changes still matters for the present values enter-
ing OSL-type debt measures, but important parts of future developments are no longer 
cut off based on a strict “accrued-to-date” rule. An important difference is that, while 
estimating ADL based on outstanding benefits can be meaningful in itself, OSL meas-
ures are obviously incomplete if they are not accompanied by parallel estimates regard-
ing future contributions. At least, interpreting the sum of all future benefit entitlements 
that will potentially arise in an existing public pension scheme as an unconditional 
measure of current implicit public debt would not make sense. Note that, if future con-
tributions are taken into account as well, the analysis of OSL measures, then called 
“open-system net liabilities”, effectively tries to exploit the inter-temporal government 
budget constraint that is at the core of recent sustainability analysis (see Blanchard 
1990, Auerbach et al. 1991). As was already mentioned, however, this should be done 
in a non-tautological way, i.e., not just highlighting the simple ex-post identity of bene-
fits and contributions that the pay-as-you-go mechanism ultimately rests on. 
 
3.2 Accounting for contributions 
From a technical point of view, estimating future contributions is no more difficult than 
estimating future benefits is.
9 In doing so, however, one has to be careful regarding 
what kinds of results can be used for meaningful comparisons with the size of out-
standing pension liabilities and for meaningful comparisons across different scenarios. 
  In some countries, current contribution rates are fixed by law, and any changes in 
these would require new legislation. These contribution rates can certainly be used as a 
benchmark to see whether the respective pension scheme is viable at current parameter 
values or, conversely, what portion of future benefits cannot be covered at current con-
tribution rates. In other countries, however, the current law does not fix the contribution 
                                            
9   Accounting for future contributions is, of course, difficult if benefits are tax financed, using revenues 
from the general government budget. The ADL definition of implicit pension debt that is based on out-
standing benefits alone is unaffected by this difficulty. To determine OS net liabilities, one could fore-
cast the revenues needed to fund future benefits based on the percentage of GDP which is currently 
spent on this purpose.   8
rate but, instead, defines a rule by which the rate has to be adjusted if otherwise the an-
nual budget would be unbalanced. A naïve “current policy scenario” would then con-
clude that the implicit pension debt, whatever its size, is always covered. Results of this 
kind could never be compared across countries, even not across different scenarios con-
structed for the same scheme. Again, keeping the contribution rate constant at its current 
level offers a useful benchmark and leads to results that are much more telling. 
  Parallel estimates regarding pension liabilities and future contributions are possible 
for ADL-type measures of implicit pension debt. Here, they make sense if the results are 
to be compared at an international level. At least, for reasons explained in the preceding 
section, directly comparing ADL-to-GDP ratios across countries may be less instructive 
than comparing those parts of ADL that are not covered by contributions at current 
rates. With the ADL definition of implicit pension debt, one has to take into account 
that, the more one moves into the future, an increasing fraction of current contributions 
will be needed to finance for other benefits than those already accrued at present. Pro-
portional corrections are thus needed in order not to overstate the present value of rele-
vant future contributions. 
  Parallel estimates for implicit liabilities and future contributions are actually re-
quired with respect to OSL-type measures because estimating the present value of all 
future benefits over an infinite time horizon is useful only if one is also able to deter-
mine to what extent these liabilities can be covered at some benchmark rate of contribu-
tions collected over the same, infinite time horizon. 
 
3.3 Estimating implicit pension debt 
What are the main ingredients needed to calculate the size of implicit pension debt, and 
of future contributions that could be used to cover it, for a given pension scheme? It 
should be clear that most of the information entering these calculations is forward-
looking, spanning relatively long periods of time, so that the final results are effectively 
good estimates, at best. These should be based on reliable long-term financial projec-
tions for future expenditure and revenues of the pension scheme under scrutiny, proba-
bly covering a multitude of baseline, sensitivity and policy scenarios. The projections, 
in turn, require long-term demographic scenarios, information regarding labour-force 
participation and actual coverage of the pension scheme both among the active and the 
retired population, assumptions regarding future developments in any of these areas 
plus, as features that are also very important for the size of implicit pension debt, as-
sumptions regarding future wage growth and a proper modelling of benefit assessment 
and relevant indexation rules.   9
  To estimate ADL-type measures of implicit pension debt, long-term projections 
regarding the pension scheme’s budget actually have to be more detailed than for OSL 
measures. The reason is that, according to the narrower definition of ADL, one has to 
distinguish throughout between benefit entitlements already accrued at the time the cal-
culation refers to and entitlements that will accrue only in the future. Therefore, infor-
mation regarding benefits already awarded has to be related, in some way, to the age 
structure of those in retirement. Ideally, a detailed record is also needed of past and fu-
ture work biographies of members who are still active. Assumptions regarding future 
work biographies are relevant at least to determine expected transitions into retirement. 
Also, to isolate the existing insured – those still active and those already retired – from 
future members of the pension scheme in broader projections, one also needs a demo-
graphic scenario with zero-immigration that reaches about 60 years into the future. 
  Estimating OSL measures of implicit pension debt requires rougher projections 
only, covering annual flows of all future benefits and contributions, regardless of whom 
they accrue to or who is paying for them. However, any long-term projection necesarily 
has a maximum time horizon. The final year should be in a sufficiently remote future 
that expected future changes – mainly those regarding demographic aspects, labour-
force participation and institutional features of the pension scheme – are fully captured. 
Ideally, there should even be a fictitious no-further-change period during which the 
economy and the pension scheme can be expected to adjust to something like a new 
steady state. Under these conditions, final year results for benefit expenditure and con-
tribution revenues can be used to estimate their open time-horizon present values, taking 
as given the discount rate as well as the (ideally, next to constant) growth rates of these 
aggregates over the final decade and using the textbook formula for converting infinite 
geometrical progressions that are converging towards zero into finite numbers. 
  Finally, note that assumptions regarding interest rates are rather important for esti-
mating the size of implicit pension debt. The same does not so much apply to financial 
projections for the respective pension scheme, at least not if the scheme does not entail 
any substantial reserves that could earn compound interest over time. But the present 
value of estimated future benefits and contributions is highly sensitive to the discount 
rate that enters these calculations. Basically, the rate that is used for this purpose should 
correspond to the interest rate paid on long-term government bonds. As this rate is usu-
ally not too sensitive to short and medium-term changes, its current value may offer an 
acceptable proxy. But the longer the time horizon covered by the estimates, i.e., with 
OSL-type measures more than with ADL measures, the more the final result will be 
influenced by this particular assumption. 
   10
3.4 Interpreting the results 
An important aspect to note is that, whatever definition is used, implicit pension debt 
can be really sizeable. With the narrow ADL-type definition, the amount of implicit 
debt involved in a broad-based pension scheme, covering a substantial fraction of the 
labour force of a given country, or even the entire population, corresponds to a projected 
stream of old-age income, based on benefit entitlements already accrued and assessed 
on net present value terms, for all current pensioners and workers, or for the entire adult 
population, over their remaining life time, that is, a period of about 60 years or more. 
With extended definitions that are more forward-looking, the size of implicit pension 
debt increases much more, and even “net” liabilities corrected for future contributions to 
be collected at current rates can exceed current GDP by factors substantially larger than 
unity if there is rapid population ageing. 
  Up to a point, if accounting for implicit pension debt in official statistics of public-
sector finances were adopted as a new standard, politicians, the public administration, 
all kinds of outside observers and the greater public would simply have to get used to 
such high figures and to new levels of total public debt. In itself, including implicit debt 
in official records does not at all change the current and prospective situation of public 
finances. It just makes visible what was already there and, perhaps more importantly, 
renders any hidden transfers from explicit deficits and debts to implicit ones impossible. 
However, some attention is needed regarding precisely what definition of implicit pen-
sion debt can be used for determining amended figures on total public debt. Calculating 
OSL-type measures of implicit debt is useful for reasons explained earlier on. But, by 
their definition, they are certainly not comparable to existing explicit debt. ADL meas-
ures, net of any financial assets included in the pension scheme’s balance sheet, are ac-
tually the only candidate for such amendments. The fact that their size is, so far, mostly 
estimated by researchers and outside bodies using long-term projections for the pension 
scheme’s budget that are sometimes more, sometimes less rough in their construction 
should not be a real obstacle to taking this concept to official use. At least in the case of 
the German public pension scheme, it should be no problem for the pension administra-
tion, with unrestricted access to the richness of their administrative data, to start calcu-
lating very hard figures regarding current ADL debt on a yearly basis using a very lim-
ited amount of assumptions that could be determined publicly and monitored externally. 
  Note, however, that in spite of all the similarities that have been pointed out so far, 
there are also important differences between explicit government debt and implicit pen-
sion liabilities. The main difference is not, or not in the first place, that implicit pension 
debt is based on mandatory arrangements, not on voluntary contracts (see Franco 1995). 
However, one of the implications is that, in sharp contrast to explicit debt, the amount of   11
implicit debt can be altered through one-sided decisions of the debtor. We will see in the 
following that simply by changing pension law, estimated amounts of implicit debt of 
the German Statutory Pension Scheme have been reduced substantially over the course 
of the last fifteen years. For industrialised countries, defaulting on (part of) their explicit 
debt in a similar fashion is scarcely an option. There are thus good reasons always to 
keep figures for implicit debt separate from those for explicit government debt. Still, 
providing reliable information regarding the former type of figures would definitely be 
useful, if only to demonstrate the necessity of reforms and to highlight their effects. 
 
4  Implicit pension debt in Germany 
4.1 The German Statutory Pension Scheme: some basic features 
The German Statutory Pension Scheme is a prototypical social insurance scheme based 
on “notional individual accounts”, with a strong link between individual contributions – 
or, rather, earnings – and individual benefit entitlements. Furthermore, it is of the tradi-
tional NDB-variant of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes where, in the absence of 
pension reform, benefits are assessed based on some kind of pre-determined rule and 
contribution rates are then adjusted annually to meet the resulting obligations. After a 
long period of depleting small amounts of funds that were meant to isolate the scheme 
against business-cycle fluctuations of current contribution revenues, it nowadays holds 
virtually no financial reserves.
10 
  The Statutory Pension Scheme is a categorical scheme in that it does not cover the 
entire labour force. There is a separate public scheme for civil servants;
11 private, but 
mandatory, schemes exist for some groups of the self-employed;
12 individuals in de-
pendent employment with earnings below the social insurance threshold (about 15 % of 
average wages of the insured) have no insurance cover at all and may be entitled to re-
ceive means-tested social assistance benefits at old age if they never moved out of this 
status over their entire active life-span. Currently, the Statutory Pension Scheme covers 
about 70 % of the active workforce. About 75 % of the population that has completed 
the statutory retirement age, being 65 or older, that is, has at least some amount of old-
age pension benefit entitlements in this scheme. 
                                            
10  According to latest official forecasts, reserves will be about 1.4 bn Euro at the end of 2005 (Genzke 
2005), just enough to cover pension expenditure for two days. 
11  Note that, in Germany, civil servants form a particular sub-group of public-sector employees. “Regu-
lar” public employees are also covered in the Statutory Pension Scheme. 
12  Other groups of the self-employed are compulsory members of the Statutory Pension Scheme for a 
limited number of years. All other individuals in self-employment have to seek private cover on a vol-
untary basis.   12
  The link that the German public pension scheme establishes between individual 
earnings and individual pension benefits is largely linear across all earnings brackets as 
well as over the period covered with contributions. In each year, individual earnings that 
are subject to contributions – between a lower and an upper earnings threshold, that is – 
are converted into “pension points” reflecting their ratio to average earnings of all in-
sured individuals in the same year. When individuals enter retirement, the sum of these 
pension points, which then represents an up-rated average of life-time earnings, is sim-
ply multiplied with a current nominal “pension value” to obtain monthly benefits. Dis-
ability pensions are assessed in a similar fashion, based on fictitious extensions of bene-
fit entitlements actually accrued until age 60. Survivor benefits are basically some per-
centage of benefit entitlements of the deceased spouse or parent, with additional rules 
governing reductions if survivor benefits coincide with own, non-derived benefit enti-
tlements of the survivor. All in all, there is thus little redistribution involved in the sys-
tem, and expected future benefit entitlements can be related very clearly to individual 
contributions made in each year of active labour-force participation.
13 
  The nominal value attached to pension points is subject to annual up-ratings that can 
be basically described as wage indexation. The general set-up of the scheme described 
here so far has been largely unchanged since 1957, when the scheme was redefined for 
the post-war period. Later on, it took German politicians a while to address the fact that 
their country is now among those hit most strongly by demographic ageing. But since 
the early 1990s, there has been a series of reforms, becoming effective in 1992, 2001 
and 2004, that were meant to make the scheme more sustainable in the face of expected 
long-term changes in the population structure. In these reforms, a number of measures 
were taken – limiting options for early retirement, tightening access to disability pen-
sions, reducing survivor benefits, etc. – that contribute to their total effect. However, the 
precise indexation mechanisms applied in annual benefit up-ratings are what really 
makes a difference across the several steps to reform. Since we will look at the effects 
of any of these reforms in the following, Table 1 lists the indexation rules entailed in the 
different arrangements. 
 
                                            
13  Of course, for the sake of simplicity, we leave out many details here. A comprehensive description of 
the German Statutory Pension Scheme, together with lots of comparative information regarding the 
systems in other EU countries, can be found in the European Commission’s database MISSOC_online 
(via http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_en.htm).   13
Table 1: Indexation rules involved in the past and current legal framework 
 Indexation  mechanism 
Pre-1992 law  Pure gross-wage indexation 
Pension reform act 1992  Pure net-wage indexation (gross wages minus average 
tax rate and all employees’ social insurance contributions) 
Pension reform act 2001  Modified net-wage indexation (gross wages minus  
pension contributions and a “recommended” rate of  
precautionary savings) 
Pension reform act 2004  Modified net-wage indexation augmented with a “sustain-
ability factor”, reducing up-ratings if the “system depend-
ency” (i.e., pensioner-to-contributor) ratio has increased 
 
  Another change that is important for our estimates is that, starting from 1999 at the 
latest, the Statutory Pension Scheme is no longer exclusively financed by contributions. 
Before, the scheme had received a subsidy from the federal government’s budget meant 
to cover a limited amount of non-contributory benefits: pensions paid to “war victims” 
who are now quickly dying out and “minimum pensions” guaranteed for individuals 
with at least 35 years of (very low) contributions, a programme that was phased out 
starting from 1992. Over the entire 1990s, there were discussions whether the subsidy 
was actually large enough to fully cover these kinds of benefits, and it was increased 
repeatedly on an ad-hoc basis, also removing up-ward pressure from the contribution 
rate. In 1999, this policy was put on a firmer footing, accompanied by another substan-
tial increase of the subsidy. It now covers about 20 percent of total benefit expenditure, 
so that current cost rates (needed to cover regular benefits) clearly exceed current con-
tribution rates. At the same time, consumption taxes and, mainly, energy taxes were 
increased to raise the additional tax revenues needed. The rationale behind these 
changes was to reduce non-wage labour costs implied in higher contribution rates, thus 
limiting unfavourable incentive effects regarding employment. While this idea may be 
defendable in itself, it is a strategy exactly opposite to the introduction of “demographic 
buffer funds”, such as the OASDI Trust Funds in the US, that has been chosen in other 
industrialised countries. 
  In the 2004 reform, the government postponed decisions regarding another element 
of reform that had been strongly recommended by an official reform commission (see 
Kommission 2003), viz. an increase in the statutory retirement age. After the 2005 elec-
tion, however, it is now highly likely that this plan will be adopted in the near future, 
while the new “grand” coalition has so far indicated no other plans for further pension   14
reform. The schedule that had been suggested, a gradual increase from age 65 to 67 be-
tween 2011 and 2035, may even be speeded up, but final decisions are yet to be taken. 
In any case, we will include this option, based on the original schedule, in our following 
projections and estimates as an additional reform scenario. 
 
4.2 Assumptions and intermediate results 
The long-term projections entering our estimates regarding the size of implicit pension 
debt involved in the German Statutory Pension Scheme are prepared using the CESifo 
Pension Model (2005 version), a comprehensive accounting model that meanwhile cov-
ers expenditure and revenues of all branches of the German social insurance system. 
Among other things, it provides all the information needed to estimate ADL and OSL-
type measures of implicit pension debt (see Section 3.3).
14 Calibration of the model is 
based on observations taken from past and current data that is available for up until 
2004. The demographic scenario that enters the simulations is taken from official pro-
jections prepared by Statistisches Bundesamt (2003), spanning the period until 2050. 
Also, assumptions regarding future developments of labour-force participation rates 
(differentiated by gender and age) and unemployment rates imply that any expected 
changes in these parameters eventually level out until 2050. Explicit projections then 
cover the period until 2100, the time from 2050 onwards essentially being a period of 
convergence. Table 2 summarises the main assumptions and, in addition, a number of 
intermediate results regarding labour market outcomes and economic performance. All 
in all, for the period until 2050, these assumptions are meant to reflect a meaningful 
“baseline” scenario for the future development of the German economy and for the 
German social insurance system that is neither particularly optimistic nor pessimistic. 
 
                                            
14  The richness in details covered in this model has its cost. Most importantly, it does not capture gen-
eral-equilibrium effects of changes in parameters assumed in, or predicted by, the simulations. In par-
ticular, it does not include any endogenous labour-supply responses to expected large increases in so-
cial insurance contributions. In this sense, any of the long-term scenarios derived from this model 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15  16 
  It has been demonstrated through earlier applications that the results obtained from 
the CESifo Pension Model are not too sensitive to changes in assumptions regarding 
productivity growth – at least, if results are expressed on relative terms: as future levels 
of pension benefits, future contribution rates, or future expenditure-to-GDP ratios, etc. 
(see Werding and Blau 2002 or Werding and Kaltschütz 2005). This finding should ex-
tend to estimates of implicit pension debt if, again, these are measured in terms of per-
GDP ratios. The reason is that, in the current legal framework, pension benefits still are 
basically indexed to wages, so that any growth in the latter simply feeds through to the 
former. Also, in themselves, projected developments of pension benefits and contribu-
tions should not be affected by different assumptions regarding real interest rates,
15 
simply because the scheme does not hold any financial reserves. However, changes in 
interest-rate assumptions are very likely to affect both the size and level of implicit pen-
sion debt. In the following, we will therefore comment on the sensitivity of our final 
results to this particular assumption. At the same time, we will refrain from conducting 
a larger set of further sensitivity analyses – based on changes in assumptions regarding 
life expectancy, migration, labour force participation, unemployment, and so forth – as 
these would lead to results that are easily predictable and, with changes in single pa-
rameters and with plausible ranges of variation, never make a fundamental difference. 
  Last but not least, the CESifo Pension Model can be easily adjusted to reflect the 
various legal arrangements that the German Statutory Pension Scheme has been subject 
to over the last fifteen years. The following figures highlight the most important inter-
mediate results obtained from the model with respect to future trends in benefit levels 
(as indicated by “quasi-replacement rates” comparing standardised benefit entitlements 
to current average gross wages; see Figure 1), pension contribution rates (as officially 
determined for each year; see Figure 2) and actual cost rates (which were required to 
balance the pension scheme’s annual budget; see Figure 3) under any of the different 
policy scenarios considered here. In these figures, we effectively concentrate on the 
time period until 2050 for which we are actively making assumptions and are not just 
keeping track of further internal adjustments. 
  It is easy to see that, over the course of the next four decades, the Statutory Pension 
Scheme’s budget will be under substantial pressure that mainly arises from the projected 
consequences of demographic change in Germany. At the same time, the reforms en-
acted over the last fifteen years make a huge difference with respect to how the burden 
involved in population ageing is allocated to pensioners and to contributors, implying 
                                            
15  Note that the real interest rate assumed in our “baseline” scenario, a constant 3.5 percent p.a. through-
out the projection horizon, is based on an average of actual observations made from 1991 onwards. 
This assumption also conforms with the expectation that currently low interest rates will move up 
again in the near future.   17
that they also have an impact on the intergenerational distribution. From a public pen-
sion scheme that may have been overly generous in terms of future benefit levels under 
the pre-1992 law, it has now evolved into a system where adequacy of benefits may 
really become an issue in the period after 2025. For this reason, the 2001 reform also 
introduced a new framework for supplementary private savings that were meant to 
partly compensate for the benefit reductions, encompassing subsidies, tax incentives and 
new regulation regarding suitable financial products. In addition, a major effect of an 
increase in the statutory retirement age which may be enacted in the near future would 
be to secure future pensioners a higher level of benefits that they are entitled to receive 
for a shorter period of time, not so much a further reduction in total benefit expenditure. 
In spite of all the reforms, however, contribution rates and, even more so, current cost 
rates must still be expected to increase substantially over the next thirty to forty years. 
 


























































Pension reform act 1992
Pension reform act 2001
Pension reform act 2004
2004 Reform + Pension age 67
 
a)  Based on standardised benefit entitlements that are derived from a full life-time work record with 
average earnings throughout and on current average wages of the active insured, all gross of income 
taxes and social insurance contributions. (Note that, for obvious reasons, pensioners are exempted 
from paying contributions to the public pension scheme and to unemployment insurance, but have to 
pay contributions for public health insurance and public long-term care insurance.) 
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2005 version).   18




























































Pension reform act 1992
Pension reform act 2001
Pension reform act 2004
2004 Reform + Pension age 67
 
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
 




















































Pension reform act 1992
Pension reform act 2001*
Pension reform act 2004*
2004 Reform + Pension age 67*
* solid lines: actual cost rates
dotted lines: official contribution rates
 
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2005 version).   19
4.3 Implicit pension debt: accrued-to-date liabilities 
Building on the financial projections presented in the preceding section, we can now 
calculate estimates regarding the size of implicit pension debt involved in the German 
Statutory Pension Scheme under different legal arrangements. In doing so, we will first 
look at implicit debt in terms of accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL). In Section 3.2 it was 
pointed out that, in this case, it is really the entire present value of outstanding benefit 
entitlements already accrued, net of the very limited amount of financial reserves of the 
German public pension scheme (see footnote 10), that can be interpreted as an addi-
tional stock of public debt. Table 3 reports the main results. 
 
Table 3: Accrued-to-date liabilities, 2005 
Implicit pension debt
a)   
€ bn.  per GDP
b) 
Pre-1992 law  6,354  291.4% 
Pension reform act 1992  5,756  264.0% 
Pension reform act 2001  5,549  254.5% 
Pension reform act 2004  5,302  243.1% 
2004 Reform + Pension age 67  5,308  243.4% 
a)  Net present value of pensions already awarded and pension entitlements accumulated until 2005, 
incl. disability and survivor benefits, over the remaining benefit period, minus existing reserves. 
b)  Per GDP in 2005 as predicted in the Joint Institutes’ Forecast of Fall 2005, amounting to € bn 2,244. 
Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
  The results included in Table 3 clearly confirm that the long-term fiscal risks associ-
ated with financing the Statutory Pension Scheme under the conditions of expected 
demographic change in Germany have been substantially reduced through the reforms 
enacted since 1992. Estimated values for implicit pension debt in terms of ADL meas-
ures have been reduced from about 290% of current GDP to about 240%, by about one 
sixth,
16 through a series of adjustments in the indexation mechanism, and a number of 
other changes in the legal framework. An interesting observation is that, on top of the 
latest reform, an increase in the statutory retirement age would have virtually no effect 
on the ADL debt measure. The reason is not only that the suggested schedule is very 
                                            
16  To check for sensitivity of these results with respect to the interest rate assumed, we can also report 
results for the alternative case where the real interest rate is set to 3% (in brackets: 4%) throughout the 
entire projection horizon. Implicit debt in terms of ADL is then 320% (267%) of GDP for the pre-1992 
law, and 266% (223%) of GDP for the current legal framework, as after the 2004 reform.   20
gradual, becoming effective rather slowly between 2011 and 2035. Furthermore, for 
those affected, this reform essentially means they receive relatively higher benefits for a 
shorter period of time – two effects that appear to almost exactly cancel out here. 
  As was explained in Section 3.2, we may compare these implicit liabilities, which 
are effectively all unfunded, to expected revenues that would be available for covering 
the relevant benefit payments if the contribution rate were held constant (see Figure 4). 
 





































Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
  Keeping the contribution rate constant (at its current level of 19.5%) is required here 
in order to make the gaps between implicit pension liabilities and future contributions 
comparable across the different scenarios.
17 Again, we can see how the consecutive pen-
sion reforms have contributed to closing these gaps. Also, as there are differences in the 
shares of total annual revenues which can be used to finance for benefit entitlements 
already accrued, the present values of future contributions entering these calculations 
are not perfectly equal across scenarios. Increasing the retirement age, for instance, 
                                            
17  Since there are rules by which contribution rates will effectively have to rise, at different speeds, the 
results shown in Figure 4 do not necessarily imply that the Statutory Pension Scheme’s budget has 
been, or still is, unbalanced in the sense that an important fraction of outstanding benefits will not be 
covered by future contributions. We will return to this interesting aspect in a minute. Whether it is 
plausible that the projected contribution rates shown in Figure 2 would have, or will, materialise is a 
different issue, though.   21
would make a higher share of contributions available for covering accrued benefit enti-
tlements during many years so that the gap between relevant benefits and contributions 
becomes smaller when compared to the current-law scenario. 
  Finally, we want to highlight an important implication of the difference between 
official contribution rates and actual cost rates implied in the current law. Before, we 
have argued that, for a pure pay-as-you-go public pension scheme with a closed budget, 
comparing existing liabilities to future revenues at projected contribution rates would 
not make sense: by definition, the two figures should exactly cancel out. However, 
things are different with the German public pension scheme under the current law. Fig-
ure 5 shows that, even if contribution rates were increased as projected in Figure 2, 
there would be a gap between benefit entitlements already accrued and future contribu-
tions that are available for covering these entitlements. According to the current law, 
this gap will have to be filled by series of annual tax-financed subsidies from the federal 
government’s budget. 
 





























Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
  In spite of some similarities, one might be reluctant to account for implicit pension 
debt – currently around 240% of GDP for Germany, according to the estimates pre-
sented here – in exactly the same way as one does for explicit government debt – about 
68% of GDP by the official, or explicit, German government debt ratio. At least, one   22
should certainly not simply add up or confuse these two numbers. However, the ratio of 
about 31% of GDP
18 that we have identified here as being a part of the total implicit 
pension debt, based on benefit entitlements already accrued, which will not be covered 
by future contributions is very closely akin to explicit debt measures: according to the 
current law, it creates a liability for future tax-payers who will have to fund the federal 
government’s budget so that it can continue to subsidise the German public pension 
scheme. The only difference is, once more, that the relevant laws could be changed in 
such a way that the burden is shifted on to future contributors or pensioners. 
 
4.4 Implicit pension debt: open-system liabilities 
In line with the reflections made in Section 3.1, we can now proceed to calculating the 
size of implicit pension debt in terms of open-system liabilities (OSL). We are then 
moving away from producing implicit debt measures which, at least conceptually, can 
be compared to current explicit government debt. On the other hand, we will obtain a 
more complete picture of the long-term implications of pension reforms. Also, in this 
case, we should directly compare implicit liabilities to future contributions (collected at 
current rates) and focus on net liabilities. Following the procedures for estimating open-
system liabilities over an infinite time horizon described in Section 3.3, we arrive at the 
final results illustrated in Figure 6. 
  The picture we obtain is basically the same as that with ADL-type measures, but 
debt measures as well as changes across the different scenarios become a lot higher. 
Implicit (“gross”) pension debt in terms of OSL measures now varies between 740% 
and 540% of current GDP, by about one fourth, that is.
19 Pension debt net of future con-
tributions that could be collected at current rates
20 varies between almost 400% and less 
than 200% of GDP, by about one half. Also, we now see an effect of increasing the 
statutory retirement age on the OSL debt measure which is due to the fact that, at each 
point in time until infinity, there will be fewer pensioners than with the current law.
21 
 
                                            
18  With alternative assumptions regarding the future real interest rate (see footnote 16), this figure varies 
between 28% and 34% of GDP. 
19  If, alternatively, the real interest rate is set to 3% (in brackets: 4%), implicit debt in terms of OSL is 
995% (586%) of GDP for the pre-1992 law, and 729% (441%) of GDP for the current legal frame-
work. Interest-rate assumptions obviously make a huge difference over the infinite time horizon. 
20  See footnote 17 on the nature of the remaining net debt. 
21  Furthermore, the net present value of future contributions increases against the other scenarios because 
all individuals have to pay contributions, at constant rates, for a longer period of time now.   23
Figure 6: Open-system liabilities and future contributions, 2005 
613% 597%
551% 538%































Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
 





























Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version).   24
When compared to the results for the 2004 law, however, the additional effect of an 
increase in the retirement age is a lot weaker than was predicted by the German Council 
of Economic Advisors (Sachverständigenrat 2003) in their annual report for 2003–04. 
Perhaps, the estimates presented there are missing the fact that, when combined with the 
“sustainability factor” introduced in the 2004 reform, increasing the retirement age im-
plies stronger benefit up-ratings. The reason is that the future pensioner-to-contributor 
ratio tends to grow more slowly, so that the mechanism for moderating annual pension 
indexation that has been intentionally created through this factor becomes less effective. 
  As with implicit pension debt in terms of ADL, we may also compare future pension 
liabilities to contributions that could be collected, under the current law, if rates were 
regularly adjusted (see Figure 7). Again, there is a gap between future benefits and con-
tributions even under these assumptions which usually imply a balance sheet in full 
equilibrium. According to our estimates, this gap amounts to no less than 150% of cur-
rent GDP.
 22 On the other hand, because of the infinite projection horizon and the con-
ceptual differences between acute explicit government debt and extremely forward-
looking, OSL-type measures of implicit debt, this is not nearly a similarly “hard” num-
ber of additional public debt as the parallel result based on the ADL measure. 
  In the first part of this paper, we followed a two-fold ambition. First, we wanted to 
take up some of the lessons emerging from the existing literature on implicit pension 
debt. In spite of some limitations, we do think that explicit calculations of its size are 
useful to obtain a fuller picture regarding the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
They may actually be needed in the light of recent practices of shifting public liabilities 
between the categories of explicit and implicit government debt. Second, we wanted to 
come up with up-dated, and rather detailed, estimates regarding the size of implicit debt 
involved in the German Statutory Pension Scheme. Going through a number of differing 
definitions and perspectives, we were hopefully able to make some interesting observa-
tions and illustrate potential applications that might be useful for other countries as well. 
  In the second part of the paper, we will turn to a related, yet less conventional issue 
that might deserve additional attention. The growing body of literature about the poten-
tial impact of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes on fertility rates and on human-
capital accumulation in general could imply, among other things, that future streams of 
pension contributions – such as those entering our estimates above – should never be 
simply taken as given. While this is obviously true for many other causes as well, there 
might even be good reasons to re-design existing systems in order to keep them viable. 
 
                                            
22  With alternative assumptions regarding the future real interest rate (see footnote 16), this figure varies 
between 117% and 206% of GDP.   25
PART B: 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO PENSIONS AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
6  Another introduction: fiscal effects of raising children 
In pay-as-you-go public pension schemes, current contributions of the active insured 
are, by definition, not used to prefund for future pension benefits accruing to the same 
set of contributors. Instead, their contributions are needed to finance current pensions of 
those who contributed to the scheme at an earlier stage. Economically, the basis of fu-
ture benefits is the earnings capacity, or the human capital, that is embodied in the next 
generation of contributors and will be utilised when the currently active are retired. In 
other words, the pay-as-you-go mechanism of financing pension benefits could be seen 
as a particular type of “human-capital” funding. 
  When looked at more closely, human capital has a quantitative and a “qualitative” 
dimension (Becker 1960),
23 that is, it is made up by the number of future contributors as 
well as their average qualifications. Against this background, most of current discus-
sions regarding the long-term sustainability of public pension schemes and public fi-
nances in general is motivated by the fact that the number of future contributors and tax-
payers – on relative terms, compared to the number of future pensioners, but in most 
cases also on absolute terms – will be declining very fast over the next three to five dec-
ades, due to a broad-based decline in fertility rates that has been observed virtually eve-
rywhere in the industrialised world during the last fifty years. At the same time, average 
qualifications of future contributors may continue to increase, as they have done in the 
past, but the net effect of these two trends on future stocks of human capital is an open 
question and has so far not been explored. 
  The economic theory of (“endogenous”) fertility that has been developed based on 
the seminal work by Becker (see Hotz et al. 1997 for a survey), offers three major po-
tential explanations as to why fertility has continued to decline in most industrialised 
countries over the second half of the 20
th century.
24 
                                            
23  We acknowledge the fact that there is a slight equivocation implied in taking Becker’s child “quality”, 
as perceived by potential parents, to be basically the same as the human capital embodied in the chil-
dren themselves (see Becker 1962). For the main thrust of our argument, however, a more careful dis-
tinction would not make a difference of first-order significance. 
24  Economic theory alone may be less suited to explain the early period of the demographic transition, in 
which total fertility rates declined from levels as high as 5.0 or more (births per woman) to somewhere 
around a replacement level of fertility, with total fertility rates of about 2.1. For these changes, a 
breakdown in habits and norms in place in agricultural societies, together with tremendous reductions 
in child mortality, may play a decisive role (Birg 1995)   26
−  Quantity-quality interaction: With rising income, potential parents may first of all 
wish to spend more resources on the “quality” of each child that they raise, at the 
expense of the number of their children (Becker and Lewis 1973). 
−  Increasing opportunity cost: A change in women’s preferences vis-à-vis the options 
of participating in the labour market or taking care of children may have induced an 
increase in the opportunity cost of children and, again, a substitution away from 
having children (Willis 1973).
25 
−  Fiscal externalities: Public interventions – most notably, the introduction and ex-
pansion of pay-as-you-go financed public pension schemes – may have created a ris-
ing fiscal externality of bringing up a child which may also have contributed to the 
fertility decline (Cigno 1986,1993). 
These different explanations are by no means mutually exclusive. Rather, they may in-
teract and re-enforce each other. An interesting aspect to note, however, is that the first 
two sets of explanations must be basically seen as rational adaptations of parents, or 
mothers, to a changing environment,
26 while the third one openly points to a potential 
source of inefficiency. Here, taking action to reduce distortions of potential parents’ 
decisions may be really required. 
  In most existing fiscal systems, there are a number of instruments of family policy 
in a broad definition, such as direct child benefits, child-related tax allowances, subsi-
dies to, or public provision of, child-care institutions, free access for children to public 
health care or public education, etc. that are reducing the total cost involved in raising a 
child (for an extensive survey, see, e.g., Bradshaw and Finch 2002). Whether this is 
seen as being justified or not, instruments of this kind should generally induce potential 
parents to have (more) children – sometimes with a particular focus on low-income par-
ents, single parents or other sub-groups, for reasons that are mainly distributional in 
their nature. Very often, however, the positive effect of these instruments for the fam-
ily’s budget are set off, or even turned over, by the fiscal effects of large-scale public 
pay-as-you-go pension schemes. These latter effects have been shown to be essentially a 
“fiscal externality” of raising children that is created through the introduction of pay-as-
you-go public pension schemes and increases with any expansion of such schemes (Sinn 
1997, 2000). Therefore, they must also be expected to interfere with parental fertility 
                                            
25  Note that, in themselves, higher qualifications, higher wages and higher participation rates for women 
that are observable throughout the industrialised world are not exogenous determinants of fertility. In-
stead, they should be seen as the result of choices shaped by preferences which, in turn, must have 
shifted in this particular direction (Rosenzweig und Schultz 1985). 
26  Only, from a welfarist point of view the actual size of opportunity costs arising at the individual level 
could be considered “too high” if there are rigidities with respect to the choice of individual working 
time, availability of child-care facilities, etc. Employers as well as public bodies could therefore do 
something to mitigate existing conflicts between the different options for time use.   27
decisions at the individual level, with a potentially negative impact on aggregate human 
capital accumulation in the countries affected or, in the terminology of Part A of this 
paper, on expected future contributions that will be collected by the same unfunded pen-
sion schemes. Similar effects may even extend to parental choices regarding the “qual-
ity” of their children, although the parallel use of subsidised, or publicly provided, edu-
cation might effectively help in containing these additional distortions. 
  Public pensions often involve a substantial fraction of total government expenditure. 
According to latest comparative figures for the year 2000 (OECD 2001, 2002), the av-
erage of OECD countries for which data were available spent about 8 percent of GDP 
on public pensions, another 5.7 percent on public health care and long-term care, where 
age-related profiles of expenditure, hence fiscal effects and problems related to popula-
tion ageing, are very similar to those in the case pension schemes, while about 6.2 per-
cent of GDP were spent on child benefits and education. In quite a number of single 
countries, these proportions are even substantially more biased towards payments accru-
ing to the elderly.
27 Therefore, pension systems, when considered in isolation, must be 
expected to create a huge fiscal externality of raising an additional child and even after 
deducting public spending on children, they leave a substantial net externality. 
  Whether these effects really matter for parental decisions regarding fertility and hu-
man capital investment is partly a matter of the appropriate model of parental decision-
making in this area, partly a matter of relevant elasticities. In the following, we will ad-
dress any of these aspects in turn, explaining the nature of the fiscal externality and dis-
cussing the relevant theoretical and empirical literature in a little more detail (Section 
6). Then, we will introduce a specific proposal of how the problems that arise can be 
dealt with in future reforms of the German public pension scheme (Section 7). 
 
6  Pensions, fertility and human capital: 
Theoretical foundations and empirical evidence 
There is, as of now, a growing body of theoretical literature that is increasingly techni-
cal and complex, dealing with the role of public pay-as-you-go pension schemes for 
fertility and human capital formation. Sub-themes that are currently discussed in this 
literature are heterogeneity among agents in terms of their preferences towards having 
children and investing in their human capital, uncertainty with respect to different as-
pects of the outcome of fertility (plus child-quality) choices, the role of different pen-
                                            
27  Furthermore, this imbalance, if one may call it like this, will definitely increase in the future. Accord-
ing to the same comparative study, average GDP shares of pension expenditure and health care expen-
diture are expected to rise by 3.7 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively, until 2050, while expenditure 
on children and families will largely stay constant.   28
sion arrangements, such as earnings-related vs flat-rate benefits, or the interplay be-
tween pension schemes and usual child benefits. Important theoretical contributions that 
have been made to this literature over the last fifteen years are Cigno (1993), Kolmar 
(1997, 2001), Ehrlich and Lui (1998), Wigger (1999), Groezen et al. (2000, 2003), Abio 
et al. (2002), Cigno and Luporini (2003), Cigno et al. (2003), Cremer et al. (2003), 
Fenge and Meier (2003, 2004), or Sinn (2004). Here, we will neglect most of the details 
unearthed in this research. Instead, we will attempt to re-state the common bottom line – 
a theory which explains a link between individual fertility decisions and public pay-as-
you-go pension schemes and implies that the latter may actually have negative repercus-
sions on the former (see Werding 1998, ch. 4) – that serves as a point of departure for 
recent, much more sophisticated work. 
  Consider, for an easy exposition, a simple overlapping-generations model with en-
dogenous fertility that entails a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. We assume that a 
representative household, constituted by individuals who are economically active in 
period t and retire in t+1, maximises a quasi-concave, twice differentiable utility func-
tion of the generic form 
   ( ) ) 1 ( , , 1 1 + + + = t t t t t n q z c U U . (1) 
Household utility depends on goods consumption in periods t and t+1, ct respectively 
zt+1, as well as a compound measure of fertility (as in Becker 1960) that is determined 
by the number of children, 1+nt+1, and the “quality” of each child, qt.
28 In other words, 
raising children increases parental utility through a consumption motive that determines 
their optimal fertility choice – where we do not disentangle qualitative from quantitative 
aspects in our model – irrespective of any considerations regarding old-age provision 
and a potential investment motive for having children that could add to this picture. 
  The intertemporal budget constraint of the household, aggregated across both sub-
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The present value of goods consumption in t and t+1 as well as the total cost of raising 
children, arising from the quality and number of children and the price per quality unit, 
pt, must be equal to gross wages earned during the active period of life, wt, minus pen-
sion contributions paid at a rate τt and plus the present value of pension benefits accru-
                                            
28  Here, the number of children is expressed in terms of their ratio over the number of parents, hence as a 
growth factor of cohort size. This allows for an easy interpretation later on. Child quality is denoted by 
a simple indicator which is scaled in such a way that it effectively modifies future wage growth that is 
due to other reasons by an additional factor related to human capital investment.   29
ing in the retirement period, πt+1. To make them comparable with nominal amounts 
from period t, period-t+1 expenditure and income are discounted at a market rate of 
interest, rt+1, that is taken to be given. Private savings (or liabilities) that could be used 
to transfer resources between the two periods drop out from equation (2), as it is as-
sumed that they must be run down, or fully redeemed, over the course of the life cycle.
29 
  The pension benefit included in (2) is modelled as an exogenous parameter. Never-
theless, the model may capture schemes with flat-rate pensions à la Beveridge as well as 
Bismarckian schemes with earnings-related pensions. In the latter case, benefits are de-
rived from individual contributions based on the scheme’s internal rate of return that is 
basically determined by payroll growth (Aaron 1966) and should be the same across all 
insured individuals in a given age cohort.
30 As long as labour-supply responses of in-
sured individuals (as well as other reasons for potential differences in their earnings) are 
ignored, the two types of pension systems are fully equivalent. 
  In the model, household decisions govern the timing of goods consumption and fer-
tility. From the first-order conditions that characterise the optimum, we can determine 
the marginal rates of substitution between current and future consumption, in equation 
(3a), and between current consumption and the compound fertility measure, in (3b): 















Equation (3a) is a familiar condition that governs optimum amounts of saving, indicat-
ing that goods consumption should be allocated to periods t and t+1 in such a way that 
the ratio of marginal utilities in both sub-periods is equal to the interest factor – as a 
shadow price of period-t consumption in the light of reductions in period-t+1 consump-
tion that are required. Equation (3b) is an analogous condition stating that the ratio of 
marginal utilities derived from ct und qt (1+nt+1) in period t should correspond to the 
relevant price ratio. 
  In making decisions that are optimal from the point of view of the respective house-
hold, however, the effects of raising children on the future financial situation of the pen-
                                            
29  In other words, the model abstracts from intergenerational transfers through bequests. Some amount of 
transfers inter vivos may however be implied in p. 
30  We abstract from child-related pension benefits that could, and actually do, exist in schemes of both 
types as well. At the moment, we want to investigate the effects of regular benefit entitlements based 
on active membership, contributions or earnings, etc. Everywhere, these benefits defined in a tradi-
tional way are quantitatively far more important than additional entitlements based on child-rearing ac-
tivities that have been added more recently.   30
sion scheme, together with the effects on individual pension benefits are entirely ne-
glected. In a pure pay-as-you-go scheme, the periodic budget constraint of the pension 
scheme implies that, in t+1, 
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According to (4), average pension benefits correspond to aggregate contributions col-
lected from Nt+1 contributors who are active in period t+1, divided by the number of 
pensioners, Nt. Abstracting from possible changes in the contribution rate τt+1 against τt, 
future contribution revenues are determined by the growth of wages, by a factor 1+gt+1, 
modified by the child-quality factor qt, and of the active population, which is given by 
1+nt+1 chosen by an average household. 
  Substituting equation (4) into the intertemporal household budget constraint to see 
what decisions regarding qt (1+nt+1) would be optimal if these links were taken into ac-
count gives 
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instead of (2).
31 The modified optimality condition (3b) reads 
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while (3a) remains unchanged.
32 The ratio of marginal utilities with respect to ct and 
qt (1+nt+1) is now larger than in equation (3b), indicating that in a social optimum – tak-
ing into account the link between raising children and financing future pension benefits 
– individuals should consume less and spend more resources on children in period t than 
appears to be optimal from a purely private point of view. As long as these links affect 
individuals only via the aggregate budget constraint of the pension scheme, individual 
                                            
31  The term (τt+1/τt) (1+gt+1) qt (1+nt+1) represents the internal rate of return involved in a pay-as-you-go 
pension scheme (in flat-rate pension schemes: for the average insured), which is fudamentally gov-
erned by payroll growth. Over longer periods of time, this growth rate should be smaller than the mar-
ket rate of interest. The larger term τt (1– ...) represents an “implicit tax” involved in the pension sys-
tem which arises from the fact that, on present value terms, benefits received in period t+1 are usually 
smaller than contributions paid in t (Sinn 2000, Fenge and Werding 2003). 
32  Fully separating choices regarding 1+n and q in models such as the present one can lead to formal 
complications, implying that an interior solution regarding these two dimensions of fertility does not 
necessarily exist, that are related to the quantity-quality interaction discussed in Becker and Lewis 
(1973). Note that this is a problem involved in formal optimising probably much more than a problem 
affecting real-world decision-making. In any case, we confine our attention to looking at the broad fer-
tility measure q (1+n) here.   31
decisions regarding higher qt (1+nt+1) mainly have an effect for third parties – through 
average benefits that are marginally higher or contribution rates that are marginally lo-
wer. Therefore, the household-level optimum represents a symmetric Nash-equilibrium 
that goes along with substantial fiscal externalities, created through the way the pension 
scheme is constructed and pension benefits are usually assessed. Consequently, total 
expenditure on children – and, by the way in which qt and 1+nt+1 typically interact, 
above all the number of children – are too small from a social point of view. 
 















  At the same time, it can be easily demonstrated that the utility of a household whose 
members are active in period t would increase if everyone would choose higher fertility 
in accordance with equation (3b’). Building on the above model, Figure 8 illustrates the 
choice of an average household between goods consumption over the entire life cycle, 
C = c + z/(1 + r) and broad fertility, q (1+n). The budget line B, with a slope p
–1, and the 
indifference curve U* characterise the household-level optimum  )*} 1 ( *, { n q C + . As 
consuming this bundle would also be feasible if the externality highlighted above were 
internalised, the budget line B’ that corresponds to equation (2’) goes through this point, 
but has a smaller slope, viz. (p – τ w/(1 + r))
–1, than line B. With standard assumptions 
regarding the shape of the utility function, this implies that the utility level U** that can 
be reached at the social optimum  *} * ) 1 ( *, * { n q C +  must exceed U*.   32
  Finally, one could assume that children have played a role for old-age provision of 
their parents before the public pension scheme was introduced – in a kind of intra-
family pay-as-you-go system implying that fertility choices were governed by a condi-
tion like (3b’). In this case, the new fertility level q(1+n)* is not only “too low” from a 
social point of view, as was shown above. It is also lower than if the pension scheme 
were absent. Introducing a public pay-as-you-go pension scheme then leads to a crowd-
ing out of earlier, private arrangements and socialises the returns to parental investment 
in children to a large extent. Consequently, fertility in terms of the combined result of 
choices regarding the number of children and expenditure per child is reduced. 
  It is important to note that this latter result is not too model-specific. What makes all 
the difference is that fertility is assumed to be endogenous, as it should be in the context 
of choices regarding old-age provision considering the long period of time spanned by 
private life-cycle decisions or public pension arrangements. The same effect of a reduc-
tion in fertility would obtain in a model where parents were assumed to be altruistic 
towards their children (as in Becker and Barro 1988) instead of pursuing an “invest-
ment” motive of providing for old age through child-rearing. In this case, parents would 
want to compensate their children for the transfers that the latter are forced to make 
through the pension scheme to the generation of their parents, but this would increase 
the cost of having children, rather then reducing the returns from children. Only if chil-
dren are seen as pure consumption goods by their parents and if there is no further inter-
generational link – through an implicit mutual exchange of services and financial sup-
port at different stages of the family life cycle or through altruistic arguments in the 
utility function of parents – fertility behaviour would not be affected by the introduction 
or expansion of a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. 
  In terms of a broad array of relevant theoretical models, the negative impact of pub-
lic pension schemes on fertility and human capital accumulation sketched above is thus 
evident. What may be debatable is whether it is really empirically relevant, for instance, 
because the elasticities of demand for children and child quality could be very low, so 
that the effect becomes negligible. In the meantime, however, there is also a number of 
empirical studies that conform with current methodological standards and support the 
theoretical predictions in that they find a significant and substantially negative effect of 
the introduction and expansion of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes on parental 
fertility decisions, controlling for a host of alternative explanations.
33 
                                            
33  In the introduction to Part B of this paper, it was already stressed that fiscal externalities are not the 
only, probably not even the dominant, reason for the continued decline in fertility rates in industrial-
ised countries. What matters is that – next to increased opportunity cost and a shift in demand towards 
fewer children of higher “quality” – they do contribute to the on-going fertility decline.   33
  Ehrlich and Zhong (1998) and, as a follow-up study, Ehrlich and Kim (2005) run 
broad-based multi-country panel analyses for no less than 57 countries and a time pe-
riod of more than 30 years finding, among other things, a clear negative relationship 
between the share of pension expenditure in GDP and annual fertility rates. Cigno and 
Rosati (1992, 1996, 1997) investigate a narrow selection of OECD countries based on 
single-country time-series analyses that, by the specification of the model and by the 
more differentiated data that are available, are closer to microeconomic models of pa-
rental fertility choices. Again, they are able to show that, in terms of robust, long-term 
relationships which are re-enforced through short-term, error correction adjustments, the 
“coverage” of public pay-as-you-go pension schemes (i.e., pension expenditure per 
population 65+, punishing generous early-retirement programmes) has a negative im-
pact on total fertility rates in all of the countries considered (Italy, the US, the UK, 
Germany, and Japan). In Cigno et al. (2003), the same authors are using an extremely 
flexible VAR model that predetermines no specific direction of causality and clearly 
confirms their results using improved data for Germany. The recent paper by Boldrin et 
al. (2005), who use a broader set of industrialised countries as a cross section, points in 
the same direction as the other econometric work mentioned here. 
  It appears that there are thus good reasons to accept that pay-as-you-go public pen-
sions do interfere with fertility decisions and human capital accumulation in general and 
that their respective impact is negative, hence unfavourable for the future viability of the 
same pension scheme. The effects should be the stronger, the more generous the pen-
sion scheme is and the higher the fraction of the labour force, or the total population, 
that is covered. Yet, effects of this kind have been shown to exist even in countries with 
relatively low levels of publicly provided pensions, such as the UK or the US. If pay-as-
you-go public pensions schemes in their traditional form turn out to be intrinsically un-
stable in the sense that they contribute to a long-term erosion of their own tax base, or 
their implicit future “funds”, the question arises of how this could be avoided. We will 
address this question in the following section. Before, we will illustrate the problem 
more fully using observations from Germany. 
 
7  Redesigning pay-as-you-go pensions: A proposal for Germany 
When looked at from a different angle, the fiscal externality created through pay-as-
you-go pensions is equal to the net injection each child is making into the pension 
budget over his or her entire life cycle. It has been demonstrated that this effect amounts 
to no less than the present value of all of the child’s life-time contributions (Sinn 1997, 
2000). The reason that only contributions matter is that, at least as an ex-ante expecta-
tion based on average behaviour, the child’s future pension benefits will be paid for by   34
his or her (grand-)children, etc. In most industrialised countries, life-time pension con-
tributions are a very substantial amount of money. It was already said that there are 
other fiscal effects of children, arising from child benefits, public education, etc., that 
could potentially balance the account of their total transactions with the public budget. 
At least in Germany, however, it appears that this does not happen. 
 
Table 4: The fiscal balance of an average child (born 2000) 
  in the German tax-transfer system 
 Fiscal  effect
a) 
Social Insurance: contributions and benefits        240,500 
   of which:   
   Statutory Pension Scheme        139,300 
   Public Health Insurance        69,800 
Taxes       227,400 
   of which:   
   Income taxes        102,000 
   Consumption taxes        125,500 
Tax-financed benefits      –  391,000 
   of which:   
   Public child care and public education      –  136,000 
   Child-related monetary transfers      –  64,900 
   Public share in opportunity costs (taxes foregone, etc.)     –  119,800 
Balance       76,900 
All amounts in Euro net present values related to the year of 2000. 
a) Taking into account average gender proportions and survival probabilities, age and gender-
specific participation rates for the education system and the labour force (as regular employees 
who are subject to the social insurance system, civil servants, self-employed, or “mini-job” 
holders), with average life-cycle profiles of earnings and old-age income in each of these cases, 
including the effects of an average number of expected descendants. 
Source: Werding and Hofmann (2005). 
 
  Based on very detailed simulations, Werding and Hofmann (2005) estimate that, for 
an average child born in the year of 2000, the expected fiscal externality created in the 
German public pension scheme’s budget is close to 140,000 Euro (see Table 4).
34 Paral-
lel effects accruing in the public health insurance system and in public long-term care 
insurance imply that the total life-time fiscal effect of an average child for the German 
                                            
34  In calculating this figure, it is taken into account that not all children will actually enter the labour 
market, become employed, survive until retirement, etc.   35
social insurance system is even 240,500 Euro. In addition, an average child will also 
pay income and consumption taxes and, at the same time, receive a substantial amount 
of tax-financed transfers over his or her entire life cycle. As a result of all these transac-
tions, there is a total fiscal externality of an average child born 2000 that amounts to 
about 77,000 Euro – based on a moderate estimate that tries not to overstate the effect 
wherever there are different options regarding how to quantify single items. 
  In Germany, bringing up a child effectively means transferring a small fortune to the 
public sector. According to the main source of the fiscal externality of a child, the pro-
ceeds are effectively used to finance public pensions (and other social insurance bene-
fits) for the preceding generation. Those who benefit are thus the child’s parents and all 
other members of the same age cohort: parents of other children plus a growing number 
of individuals who effectively remained childless. In a conventional pay-as-you-go so-
cial insurance scheme, all members of the parents’ generation have equal access to so-
cial insurance benefits by a legal entitlement that does not reflect individual investment 
in the next generation’s human capital, hence in the tax base that is needed to finance 
these entitlements. In doing so, pay-as-you-go schemes also discourage private saving 
as a precautionary measure that offers the main alternative way of providing for old age. 
In a sense, old-age provision offered by a conventional pay-as-you-go scheme is inde-
pendent of having used any of the two basic precautionary arrangements that are feasi-
ble – investing in financial assets and physical capital or investing in human capital. It 
should not come as a surprise that, over time, an arrangement with such precarious in-
centives runs into financial trouble. 
  First of all, solving the problems involved in pay-as-you-go public pensions that 
have been highlighted here – the disincentives that they induce with respect to fertility 
and human capital investment through the fiscal externality they create – is a matter of 
efficiency. On the distributional side, the corresponding norm that could serve as a ra-
tionale in reforming the system is the benefit principle: a quid pro quo by which those 
who have children and invest in their human capital should be rewarded in one way or 
another for their contribution to keeping pay-as-you-go systems of social insurance fi-
nancially viable in future years. Interestingly, a move in a similar direction is suggested 
by pure equity concerns. This is indicated by the fact that, in Germany, raising children 
is nowadays seen as one of the main poverty risks.
35 The coincidence of these two dis-
tributional norms is a rare exception as they are usually conflicting with each other. 
                                            
35  See the latest “poverty report” prepared on behalf of the German Federal Government (Bundesregie-
rung 2005). Note that poverty is defined on relative terms in this report. The finding could therefore 
effectively suggest that families are not really “too poor” when compared to childless households but 
that the latter are “too rich” as they are able to free-ride on other people’s investment in children re-
garding a substantial fraction of their old-age provisions.   36
  Stepping back, a solution of the aforementioned problems can be achieved in several 
ways. First, by scaling back existing pay-as-you-go pension schemes; taken in itself, 
however, a change of this kind does not necessarily restore the incentive for (potential) 
parents to raise children. Second, by expanding existing measures of family policies in 
order to reduce the fiscal externality of a child, thus attempting to off-set negative ef-
fects of a public intervention through positive effects of additional interventions; such a 
policy is likely to stimulate fertility
36 but, because of the multiple distortions that all 
kinds of fiscal interventions are likely to create, it is unlikely to neutralise the negative 
effect of public pensions in a perfect way. Third, through changes within the public pen-
sion scheme by which individual benefit entitlements would be differentiated according 
to individual efforts to bring up and educate children – as the most basic case, by differ-
entiating them by the number of children. 
  For the German Statutory Pension Scheme, a solution of the latter kind has been 
proposed by Werding and Sinn (2000, 2005) or Sinn (2005) on behalf of the Ifo Insti-
tute for Economic Research. The proposal takes as given that, in order to deal with on-
going increases in life expectancy, an extension of the statutory retirement age (to age 
67, like in the reform scenario considered in Part A of this paper) is definitely needed. 
In addition, the proposal entails three further changes against the current law. 
−  Statutory Pension Scheme: The rate of contributions to the existing scheme is defi-
nitely capped at its current level, and the large subsidy from the federal budget is 
gradually removed (and transferred to the new “child pension” scheme, for instance; 
see the next step). As a consequence of demographic change, the benefit level will 
then decline even more than is implied in the current law, in spite of the projected 
increase in the retirement age. 
−  Child Pension Scheme: For individuals who have children, the existing public pen-
sion scheme is supplemented by a second public, pay-as-you-go financed pillar. It is 
financed by contributions raised from all employed individuals (or simply by gen-
eral taxation) and, for each child raised, offers an additional lump-sum benefit to all 
parents. This benefit is scaled in such a way that, for parents of three of more chil-
dren, it fully makes up for future reductions in the level of pension benefits of the 
existing scheme against the current benefit level. 
−  Supplementary savings: At the same time, individuals who have few or no children 
are legally obliged to make supplementary savings for their old age, based on a sav-
ing rate that would again fully make up for losses against the current benefit level. 
                                            
36  There are numerous empirical studies that confirm a positive effect of child benefits on parental fertil-
ity decisions; for a recent survey, see Meier (2005). A weak, but positive effect that directly counter-
acts the negative impact of pensions is also found in the papers by Cigno and Rosati (1996) and Cigno 
et al. (2003).   37
Individuals are subjected to this obligation as soon as they enter employment; when-
ever they have a child (up to a maximum of three), their rate of mandatory savings is 
reduced (by one third), and part of the wealth already accumulated in this scheme 
becomes available for immediate use. 
  Figures 9 und 10 illustrate the effect of the reform suggested by Ifo on the main 
parameters of total public old-age provision, combining results for the Statutory Pension 
Scheme and for the new Child Pension Scheme.
37 Freezing the official contribution rate 
of the existing system is an important step towards containing the amount of intergen-
erational redistribution involved in any unfunded public pension scheme. Note that, in a 
sense, any increase in contribution rate necessitated in a “defined benefit” scheme could 
be seen as an introduction of an additional pay-as-you-go scheme on top of the existing 
one, with higher implicit debt and even stronger adverse effects for fertility and human 
capital accumulation. Implementing the new Child Pension Scheme as a universal sys-
tem is the key ingredient for rewarding parental human capital investment and keeping 
up the total benefit level of those who actually have children, with effects that are not 
exclusively related to the limits defined by a categorical system. 
  Finally, the introduction of mandatory, supplementary savings for everyone else 
serves two further purposes. On the one hand, it is needed to avoid incentive problems 
regarding adequate old-age provisions that arise from the existence of other, means-
tested instruments of income support. Since the future level of Statutory Pension bene-
fits is likely to fall to a level where individuals would be entitled to receive such means-
tested benefits as well, they would not have an incentive to make additional savings if 
this were left to their voluntary decisions. On the other hand, rules regarding savings 
rates and stocks of wealth that are differentiated by the number of children imply that 
the new system has a strong impact on current net household income whenever a child 
is born. Parents can then use part of their accumulated savings to cover child costs, and 
they have to save less of their current income in subsequent years when they have 
higher current spending on children. For potential parents, the consequences of the new 
arrangement are thus not only relevant at old age, where they will be entitled to receive 
higher pension benefits, but they make a difference already during earlier stages of the 
family life cycle, when the children are young and the family budget is under high ten-
sion (see Figure 11 where these effects are demonstrated for the case of a family with 
two children). If the expectation to receive higher pensions in the future is effectively 
 
                                            
37  Note that fertility is not endogenous in the simulation model and that there are no assumptions regard-
ing changes in fertility vis-à-vis the simulations run in Part A of this paper. Further, favourable effects 
of Ifo’s proposal that may matter for the pension scheme’s budget starting from some point in time af-
ter 2025 are thus not included in the following figures.   38













































Pension reform act 2004*
Ifo's Proposal*
* solid lines: actual cost rates
dotted lines: official contribution rates
 
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2005 version) 
 
 

























































Pension reform act 2004
Ifo's proposal (3 children)
Ifo's proposal (2 children)
Ifo's proposal (1 child)
Ifo's proposal (childless)
 
a) See  figure  1. 
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2005 version).   39
Figure 11: Net household income for a couple with two children 






























































































Pension reform act 2004














Source: CESifo Pension Model (2005 version). 
 
not strong enough to induce young people to have children and invest in their human 
capital, these immediate effects should definitely have an impact. 
  All in all, this proposal for redesigning the German Statutory Pension Scheme – or, 
rather, the entire system of old-age provision in Germany – can therefore not only con-
tribute to limiting the amount of implicit pension debt involved in the current system. In 
addition, it should bring about a substantially higher degree of pre-funding of future old-
age income than the current system does and it should fix the problems that have been 
primarily addressed in Part B of this paper, making sure that the number of contributors 
and the stock of human capital that is available for covering unfunded pension liabilities 
in the future does not decline any further, driven by disincentives that the pension 
scheme itself is creating, as it may have done in the past and might otherwise continue 
to do in the future. In any case, the sustainability of the German public pension scheme 
should be greatly improved. 
  Among German politicians and in the greater public, the ideas discussed in part B 
of this paper are nowadays far from being popular. The small extensions of public pen-
sion benefits granted to mothers that have been introduced in the Statutory Pension 
Scheme starting from 1986 were mainly pushed through by a series of rulings of the   40
German Court of Justice, rather then by voluntary decision of politicians.
38 There is now 
a wide-spread feeling that private fertility choices should have nothing to do with public 
old-age provision. This, in itself, can be taken to indicate the massive changes in habits 
and informal ways of thinking that more than 100 years of public pension provision 
have brought about, effectively destroying any public awareness of the fact that incen-
tives which are operative at an individual level should correspond to economic linkages 
that still, and inevitably, exist at an aggregate level. 
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